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Abstract:  
 
We explore the impact of labour turnover on firm performance by analysing the 
predictions of an extension of the efficiency wage model of Salop (1979) developed by 
Garino and Martin (2007), which separates incumbent and newly hired workers in the 
production function. Within this theoretical framework, an exogenous increase in the 
turnover rate can increase profits if firms do not choose wages unilaterally. We test the 
theoretical predictions of the model using UK cross-section establishment-level data, 
the 2004 Workplace and Employee Relations Survey. In accordance with our theoretical 
priors, the empirical results support the standard inverse relationship between the quit 
rate and firm performance where firms unilaterally choose the wage and generally 
support a positive relationship between firm performance and the quit rate where trade 
unions influence wage setting.  
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 1.  Introduction and Background 
Labour turnover is an important feature of the labour market: for example, in OECD 
countries, approximately 10-15% of workers quit their jobs every year (OECD 
Economic Outlook, 1999), with the quit rate for the UK estimated at approximately 
10% in 2004 (Quintini and Martin, 2006). Labour turnover affects both workers and 
firms: workers may need to learn new job-specific skills, whilst firms incur the costs of 
hiring and training new workers. Incoming workers, however, may be more highly 
motivated, better educated and more highly skilled. Hence, turnover may actually 
enhance firm performance, a possibility which has attracted limited attention in the 
existing literature. The existing literature has generally focused on the impact of 
turnover on workers rather than on firms, with the following exceptions: turnover and 
hiring costs have been studied by Burgess and Dolado, 1989, Hammermesh, 1995 and 
Hammermesh and Pfann, 1996, while Hutchinson et al, 1997, and Kersley and Martin, 
1997, have analysed the impact of turnover on productivity. The theory used to explain 
the impact of turnover on firms is mostly based on the well known efficiency wage 
model of Salop (1979), in which firms choose wages so as to minimise the marginal 
cost of labour, balancing the marginal effect of higher wages against the marginal 
reduction in training costs induced by higher wages. 
In this paper, we contribute to the literature exploring the implications of labour 
turnover for the firm. To be specific, we empirically explore the theoretical predictions 
of an extension to the model of Salop (1979) developed by Garino and Martin (2007), 
which distinguishes between newly hired and incumbent workers, since the latter have 
more job-specific human capital but may have less general human capital. A higher 
turnover rate implies that the proportion of new hires in the workforce is larger. If this 
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causes a sufficiently large increase in productivity then an increase in turnover can 
actually increase profits. Garino and Martin (2007) show that this effect is possible, but 
only when firms do not unilaterally choose the wage – for example when the wage is 
negotiated with a union or set nationally. When the firm chooses the wage unilaterally, 
as in Salop’s original model, the impact of turnover on profits is negative.   
In order to test the predictions from this theoretical framework, we analyse 
cross-section, establishment-level data from the 2004 Workplace and Employee 
Relations Survey (WERS) to ascertain the nature of the relationship between turnover 
and firm performance. Our findings support the inverse relationship predicted by Salop 
(1979) if firms are able to choose wages unilaterally. In contrast, where firms do not set 
wages unilaterally, our empirical analysis generally supports a positive relationship 
between the quit rate and firm performance. The paper is set out as follows: Section 2 
summarises the theoretical underpinnings, whilst Sections 3 and 4 present our empirical 
analysis and Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Theoretical Underpinnings 
Output depends on the labour input of newly hired and incumbent workers. New hires 
and incumbents have different levels of job-specific human capital and are imperfect 
substitutes. The production function is given by ( , , , )Y F h I λ σ= , where  is the 
number of new hires, 
h
I  is the number of incumbents, λ  denotes exogenous production-
specific factors and σ  is the elasticity of substitution between new hires and 
incumbents.1 Firms pay all workers the same wage, , and the fixed unit cost of 
hiring and training new workers is 
0>w
0>τ . The per-period turnover rate, i.e. the 
proportion of the existing workforce who quit, is a fixed function q  of wages and 
exogenous factors, including the general market wage that workers expect to earn if 
                                                 
1 See Garino and Martin (2007) for a more detailed analysis of aspects of this model. 
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they quit, θ :  
( , )q q w θ=           (1) 
where , , , 0wq < 0wwq > 0qθ > 0qθθ <  and 0wq θ < .  In every period,  workers 
quit implying  and 
qN
h qN= (1 )I q N= − . We consider the steady state and normalise 
output prices to unity.2 Profits are given by:  
NqwNqqNF )(),,)1(,( τλσ +−−=Π       (2) 
Assume the firm chooses employment and wages. At an interior solution, the first-order 
conditions are as follows: 
0)()1( =+−−+=Π qwFqqF IhN τ        (3) 
[ 0)1()( =+−−=Π wIhww qFFqN ]τ        (4) 
If new hires and incumbents are perfect substitutes then 0FF Ih =−  and the model 
reduces to Salop (1979). The response of profits to turnover factors is obtained by 
comparative statics: 
0<=−−==
w
θ
θIhθqθ q
qNqτFFNq )(ΠΠ
      (5) 
The negative sign arises because a rise in θ  can only increase profits if, for a given 
turnover cost, new hires are sufficiently more productive than incumbents at the margin. 
Since , equation (4) implies that 0wq < 0<−− τIh FF . At the optimal wage, new hires 
are less productive than incumbents and an increase in θ  reduces profits.  
Now suppose firms do not choose the wage unilaterally.3 There is only a first-
order condition for employment, so the impact of turnover on profits is given by: 
[ θθθwIhθqθwθ wqwqτFFNqw ]−+−−=+= ))((ΠΠΠ     (6) 
                                                 
2 A dynamic version of our model is available on request.  
3 For example, if a firm negotiates wages with a union, wages will reflect all factors relevant to both firm 
and union, as well as their relative bargaining power (Garino and Martin, 2000). 
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The number of new hires increases by θθ qwqw +  and incumbents decrease by the same 
amount. The resulting change in output, )qwq)(FF( wIh θθ +− , is ambiguous, since the 
signs of both θθ qwqw +  and ( Ih FF )−  are ambiguous. In θθ qwqw + , wθ  is expected to 
be positive,  and , while the sign of 0<wq 0qθ > ( )Ih FF −  depends on the relative 
productivities of incumbents and new hires. The remaining term θθθτ w)qwq( w ++  
represents the impact on profits of the change in total labour costs induced by a rise in 
θ , which is itself ambiguous. Overall, therefore, the sign of equation (6) is ambiguous. 
For sufficiently high levels of  and  , the impact of labour turnover on firm profits 
could be positive. 
wq hF
3.  Data and Methodology 
In order to explore the relationship between turnover and firm performance, we analyse 
data from the 2004 cross-section Workplace and Employee Relations Survey (WERS). 
This is the fifth in a Government funded series of surveys conducted at British workplaces, 
the previous four surveys having been conducted in 1980, 1984, 1990 and 1998. The aim 
of the WERS survey is to provide nationally representative data on the current state of 
workplace relations and employment practices in Britain, and it is widely regarded as the 
principal source of information pertaining to changes in British industrial relations 
(Chaplin et al., 2005). The survey population for the 2004 WERS is all British workplaces 
with at least five employees except for those in agriculture, hunting and forestry, fishing, 
mining and quarrying, private households with employed persons, and extra-territorial 
organisations. The sample comprises 2295 workplaces, whilst the sample used for our 
econometric analysis includes 1900 workplaces due to missing values. The 2004 WERS 
comprises four main sections: the Management Questionnaire; the Worker Representative 
Questionnaire; the Financial Performance Questionnaire; and the Employee Questionnaire. 
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For the purposes of this study, we focus on the workplace level data elicited by the 
Management Questionnaire.  
In the Management Questionnaire, managers were asked to specify how many 
employees (full-time and part-time) were on the payroll 12 months ago and how many 
of these employees stopped working at the workplace as they resigned or left 
voluntarily. The distinction between voluntary quits and other reasons for leaving the 
firm is particularly important for our analysis since it allows a close match between the 
theoretical framework and the empirical analysis. We use the responses to this question 
to calculate the quit rate in each workplace. The average quit rate in our sample is 
13.28%.  
As pointed out in the introduction, it may be the case that new hires are better 
skilled or more highly educated than incumbent employees. One implication of this is 
that firms with a low turnover rate may not necessarily have a more highly productive 
workforce. Using the information on the quit rate elicited from the 2004 WERS 
Management Questionnaire, we label workplaces according to whether they are in the 
first, second, third or fourth quartile of the quit rate distribution. We have matched this 
information with employee level information from the Employee Questionnaire, which 
up to 25 employees from each workplace were asked to complete, yielding a sample of 
18,634 employees after conditioning on missing values. The employee level data 
includes detailed information on human capital measures.  
Table 1, which is based on matched data from the Employee Questionnaire and 
the Management Questionnaire, presents information pertaining to the average level of 
human capital characteristics of employees across workplaces grouped according to 
quartiles of the quit rate distribution. The measures of human capital relate to the 
proportions of employees with: no academic qualifications; GCSEs grades D to G; 
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GCSEs grades A to C; A levels; first degree; higher degree; other academic 
qualifications; vocational qualifications; and an index of IT skills.4 It is apparent that in 
the third quartile, the index of IT skills is relatively high as are the percentages of 
employees with A levels, a first degree and a higher degree. Such findings support the 
argument that turnover may be beneficial for the workplace, with relatively high 
turnover (i.e. turnover in the third quartile) being associated with a workforce with 
relatively high measures of human capital. In addition, qualifications and skills appear 
to be most prevalent in the third quartile, rather than the fourth quartile, which suggests 
that the relationship between turnover and human capital is not monotonic.  
In Table 1, we also present summary statistics relating to the human capital 
characteristics of the sample of employees who have been working at the workplace for 
less than one year and the sample of those employees who have been at the workplace 
for more than one year. With respect to academic qualifications, it is apparent that for 
all categories of qualifications, with the exception of other qualifications, the 
percentages are higher for the sample of new recruits suggesting that, on average, new 
recruits are more highly qualified than incumbent employees. In particular, the 
proportion of employees reporting that they have no academic qualifications is 
significantly lower amongst the new recruits. 
Thus, the summary statistics from the matched establishment and employee 
level data suggest that high turnover may be associated with high levels of human 
capital, which in turn may be beneficial for firm performance. Following the theoretical 
framework summarised in Section 2, we explore the relationship between firm 
performance and turnover by distinguishing between those firms who set wages 
                                                 
4 There are thirteen possible IT skills: word processing; sending or receiving e-mail; checking stock 
movements, availability or pricing; record keeping; ordering or purchasing; controlling or monitoring 
processes or machinery; data entry; data analysis; desk-top publishing; computer-aided design; 
programming or compiling syntax; and any other task. The index runs from 0 to 13 depending on the 
number of IT skills that the employee reports. 
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unilaterally and those who do not set wages unilaterally. One of the most common 
reasons why employers may not be able to set wages unilaterally in the UK may be due 
to the fact that wages are set through negotiations with trade unions.  
In the 2004 WERS, information is available relating to the proportion of 
employees who have their pay set through negotiations with trade unions either at their 
workplace or at a higher level.  A response of 100%, therefore, indicates that the firm 
has no unilateral power over wage setting: 26% of the sample, 484 workplaces, state 
that 100% of their employees have their pay set via negotiations with trade unions. Out 
of the remaining 74% of workplaces, there are 1037 workplaces with a 0% response. 
 With respect to measures of workplace performance, there is only one measure 
available in the WERS 2004 Management Questionnaire, which relates to overall 
financial performance. Managers are asked to assess their workplace’s financial 
performance as compared to other establishments in the same industry. Responses are 
given on a five point scale: ‘a lot better than average’; ‘better than average’; ‘about 
average for industry’; ‘below average’; and, finally, ‘a lot below average’.5 It is 
apparent that this measure of financial performance is subjective. Furthermore, the 
response rates below suggest that there is a bias towards the ‘above average’ categories. 
Evaluations of this subjective measure, however, have indicated that the ordinal 
properties of the data are unaffected by such bias (see Bryson et al, 2005). Hence, we 
use the responses to these questions to construct a four point index representing 
financial performance ( ): wpFP
                                                 
5 Cases where the manager indicated that either ‘no comparison is possible’ or ‘relevant data is not 
available’ were omitted from our econometric analysis. Given the low response rate for the ‘a lot below 
average’ category, 1%, we collapse the last two categories together. 
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where wp denotes the workplace subscript and the figures in parenthesis indicate the 
percentage in each category. We then conduct weighted ordered probit analysis to 
explore the determinants of :wpFP
6
wpwpwpwpwp vNUWSγNUWSqγqγXπFP ++•++′= 321*     (8) 
where  represents a latent variable denoting the unobserved propensity of 
workplace wp to achieve a certain level of financial performance;  denotes the quit 
rate;  is a vector of workplace characteristics expected to influence  ; 
*
wpFP
wpq
wpX
*
wpFP β  is the 
associated coefficients vector;  represents the coefficient on ; NUWS is a dummy 
variable indicating that the workplace is characterised by non unilateral wage setting 
(i.e. where the manager stated that 100% of employees at the workplace have their pay 
set via negotiations with trade unions); and  is a random error term. The inclusion of 
the interaction term between  and NUWS enables us to explore whether the effect of 
quit rates on firm level financial performance varies according to whether wages are set 
unilaterally or not.  
1γ wpq
wpv
wpq
wpX  includes: industry; workplace size and age; foreign ownership; union 
density; an index of the percentage of the establishment’s sales revenue or operating 
costs accounted for by labour costs; operating hours of 24 hours a day; whether the 
establishment faces competition from overseas based suppliers; and whether the current 
                                                 
6 The data was weighted as workplaces had different probabilities of being selected for the survey. The 
sampling frame for the 2004 WERS was the Inter-Departmental Business Register maintained by the 
Office for National Statistics. Differential sampling fractions have been used according to the number of 
employees and the 2003 Standard Industrial Classification (Chaplin et al., 2005). 
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state of the market is growing. Workforce characteristics include the proportions of: 
females, part-timers, fixed term contract workers, agency workers, managers, 
professionals, associate professional and technical employees, administrative and 
secretarial employees, skilled trade employees, personal service employees, operative 
employees and routine unskilled employees.7 Summary statistics of the variables used 
in the empirical analysis are presented in Table 2. 
We explore the robustness of our empirical analysis in four ways. Firstly, we re-
estimate equation (8) via a generalised ordered probit model, which allows the cut-off 
points to vary between workplaces (see Williams, 2006). Secondly, we omit the 
interaction term and the unilateral wage setting control and we estimate equation (8) 
separately for firms that unilaterally set wages and for those who do not set wages 
unilaterally. We present one set of results whereby we do not control for sample 
selection bias and one set of results whereby we include an inverse mill ratio term in the 
financial performance equation to control for the possible endogeneity of NUWS. The 
inverse mill ratio term is based on a probit model with NUWS as the dependent variable 
and the following set of over-identifying instruments, which are jointly significant at the 
1% level in the probit model: the number of trade unions who have members at the 
workplace; the number of trade unions recognised by management for negotiations over 
pay and conditions for any section of the workforce; and a dummy variable for whether 
trade union subscriptions are deducted from employees’ pay. For the unilateral wage 
setting analysis, we explore two samples: firstly, where NUWS equals zero; and, 
secondly, where the manager indicates that no employees at the workplace have their 
pay set through negotiations with trade unions either at the workplace or at a higher 
                                                 
7 The variables denoting the occupational structure of the workplace are included to control for human 
capital at the workplace. Unfortunately, WERS does not include information relating to education across 
the whole workforce (only for the sample of employees who completed the Employee Questionnaire). 
Since education and occupation are highly correlated, we include the occupation variables to control for 
workplace human capital. 
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level. 
As a third robustness check, we analyse data from the WERS 2004 Financial 
Performance Questionnaire, which is the first in the WERS series to include monetary 
measures of the financial performance of the workplaces. After completion of the 
Management Questionnaire, a Financial Performance Questionnaire was left for 
‘someone responsible for financial matters at the workplace’ to complete. The response 
rate for the Financial Performance questionnaire (as a proportion of questionnaires 
placed) is 51.5% (see Chaplin et al., 2005). Our sample size is reduced to 832 
establishments once we allow for missing values. Hence, we explore the relationship 
between the quit rate and a monetary rather than categorical indicator of financial 
performance in order to explore the robustness of our empirical findings. To be specific, 
we explore the relationship between the natural logarithm of sales turnover (i.e. the total 
amount received in respect of sales of goods and services excluding value added tax) 
and the quit rate. For this smaller sample of workplaces, the mean turnover rate is at 
12.92% (standard deviation of 15.99), slightly lower than that reported for the larger 
sample. The dependent variable is specified as the natural logarithm of sales turnover, 
which has a mean value of 9.2107.8
4.  Results 
Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients related to the financial performance model 
represented by equation (8). It is apparent that the estimated coefficient on the quit rate 
variable is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. The inverse relationship 
                                                 
8 A variety of measures of financial performance are available in the WERS Financial Performance 
Questionnaire. The relatively low response rate to this part of the survey, combined with missing values, 
precludes their inclusion in our empirical analysis. The low response rate reflects the fact that a high 
proportion of workplaces declined to take part in the Financial Performance Questionnaire. Furthermore, 
there is some evidence that the workplaces which did not take part in this aspect of WERS were not a 
random sample (Chaplin et al., 2005). In the following analysis, weights were used which were calculated 
by multiplying the inverse of the probability of WERS workplaces responding to the Financial 
Performance Questionnaire with the establishment weight (see footnote 6 and Chaplin et al., 2005). 
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between financial performance and the quit rate is in accordance with the predictions of 
Salop (1979). In contrast, the interaction term between the quit rate and the dummy 
variable representing non unilateral wage setting is characterised by a positive estimated 
coefficient. Table 3 presents the associated marginal effects in Panel A, which reveal how 
the quit rate influences the probability of being in each of the four financial performance 
categories. The quit rate is positively associated with the probability of being in the lowest 
two categories of financial performance and, in accordance with the predictions of Salop 
(1979), negatively associated with being in the two ‘better than average’ financial 
performance categories. This pattern is reversed in the marginal effects relating to the 
interaction term between the quit rate and the non unilateral wage setting dummy variable, 
with turnover being positively (negatively) associated with the relatively high (low) levels 
of financial performance. In accordance with our theoretical priors, the findings suggest 
that there are distinct differences in the relationship between the quit rate and financial 
performance across firms depending on whether or not they set pay unilaterally. In Panel 
B, the marginal effects from the generalised ordered probit model are presented. It is 
apparent that only the marginal effects associated with the highest level of financial 
performance attain statistical significance. However, the pattern of the marginal effects ties 
in with those from the ordered probit model with the quit rate being inversely associated 
with the probability of being in the ‘above average’ financial performance category and the 
interaction term being characterised by a positive association. 
 In Panel C, we present the marginal effect relating to the quit rate variable for the 
sample of workplaces characterised by non unilateral wage setting. The pattern of the 
marginal effects accords with our theoretical prediction that turnover may be positively 
associated with firm performance: the marginal effects suggest that turnover may be 
associated with a lower (higher) probability of being in the relatively low (high) categories 
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of firm financial performance. In Panel F, the corresponding analysis is summarised – the 
only difference being the inclusion of an inverse mills ratio term incorporated to control for 
sample selection bias. It is apparent that the pattern of the marginal effects is robust to its 
inclusion. 
In Panel D, we repeat the analysis for those firms where NUWS equals zero and the 
estimates are not corrected for potential sample selection bias. The pattern of the marginal 
effects ties in with that predicted within the standard Salop (1979) framework whereby 
turnover is associated with an inverse (positive) probability of being in the higher (lower) 
financial performance categories. This finding is robust to controlling for sample selection 
bias (see Panel G). In Panel E, we impose a stricter definition for unilateral wage setting 
where no employees at the workplace have their pay set through negotiations with trade 
unions either at this workplace or at a higher level. It is apparent that the pattern of the 
estimated marginal effects in Panel E (no correction for sample selection bias) and 
Panel H (corrected for potential sample selection bias) ties in with those for the sample 
of workplaces where NUWS equals zero and, hence, with the predictions of Salop 
(1979). 
In Table 4, we repeat the analysis presented in Table 3 Panels C to H replacing 
the categorical dependent variable with a continuous measure of firm performance: the 
sales turnover of the firm. We specify a weighted OLS model with the logarithm of 
sales turnover as the dependent variable and the set of explanatory variables is 
consistent with that in equations (2) and (3) above where the weights reflect the 
probability of selection into the survey. In the case of unilateral wage setting, the 
inverse association between firm performance and labour turnover prevails, as predicted 
by Salop (1979). In contrast, where there is no unilateral pay setting, the estimated 
relationship between labour turnover and firm performance is statistically insignificant. 
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Such a finding of an ambiguous relationship between firm performance and labour 
turnover ties in with the theoretical analysis presented in Section II, where the sign of 
equation (6) is ambiguous. 
5. Conclusions 
We have explored the theoretical predictions from an extension to the efficiency wage 
model of Salop (1979) developed by Garino and Martin (2007), where incumbent and 
newly hired workers are separated in the production function. If firms can choose wages 
unilaterally, the effect of turnover on profits is negative, since, for a given turnover 
function, profit maximising firms adjust the wage to minimise the cost of labour. In the 
case where firms cannot choose the wage unilaterally, the impact of an exogenous increase 
in turnover on the maximun profit function can be positive as well as negative. Our 
empirical analysis of workplace level data drawn from the WERS 2004 suggests that the 
nature of the relationship between employee turnover and firm performance is influenced 
by whether workplaces set pay unilaterally. Our empirical findings accord with the 
predictions of the theoretical framework supporting the standard inverse relationship 
between the quit rate and firm performance where workplaces are able to choose wages 
unencumbered by trade union negotiations. In cases, where workplaces cannot choose 
wages unilaterally, our empirical findings support the possibility that a positive association 
between firm performance and turnover may prevail.  
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Table 1: Human Capital Measures, Quit Rates and Workplace Tenure (Matched Management and Employee Questionnaire Data) 
 
Human Capital Measures 1qq < 21 qqq <≤ 32 qqq ≤< 3qq >  Tenure: ≤  1 year Tenure: > 1 year
No Academic Qualifications   0.1520 0.1686 0.1498 0.1780 0.1030  0.1735  
GCSE D-G 0.2798  0.2797 0.2607 0.2885 0.2863  0.2751  
GCSE A-C 0.5615 0.5449 0.5585 0.5041 0.5612  0.5408  
A levels  0.3067 0.3046 0.3225 0.2717 0.3538  0.2935  
First Degree  0.2445 0.2533 0.2709 0.1973 0.2840  0.2367  
Higher Degree 0.0539 0.0709 0.0768 0.0429 0.0722  0.0609  
Other Academic Qualifications 0.3198 0.3191 0.3253 0.2870 0.3097  0.3152  
Vocational Qualifications 0.9398 0.9394 0.9358 0.9259 0.9170  0.9402  
Index of IT Skills 3.4241  3.5852  3.6893  3.1298  3.2962  3.5163  
Number of Observations 4171 5807 4673 3983 2951 15611
 Notes:  denotes the 251q
th quartile ( = 0.0124);  denotes the 501q 2q 3q2q
th quartile ( = 0.0816);  denotes the 75th quartile ( =0.1692). 3q
18
         
 
 
     
 
Table 2: Financial Performance and Labour Turnover (Sample = All Workplaces) 
 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient T-Stat Mean Standard Deviation 
Quit Rate -0.5168  -2.06  0.1328  0.3386  
Quit Rate*Non Unilateral Wage Setting 1.6279  2.30  0.0199  0.0627
Non Unilateral Wage Setting -0.3475  -2.48  0.2547  0.4358
Ln(Workplace Size) 0.1474  3.36  4.4674  1.7566  
Ln(Workplace Age) 0.0644  1.63  3.0372  1.2045  
Foreign Owned 0.1594 1.01    0.1379  0.3449  
Private Sector 0.0891  0.63  0.7100 0.4539  
24 Hours per Day -0.2280  -1.89  0.4979  0.5001  
Overseas Competition -0.2384  -1.76  0.1426 0.3498  
Growing Market 0.2581  2.75  0.3642 0.4813  
Labour Costs/Sales Revenue -0.0022  -0.18  2.1705 1.2562  
% Trade Union Members 0.0039  1.20  0.2857 0.1302  
% Fixed Term contract employees 0.1382  0.88    0.0600  0.1659  
% Agency workers -0.7780  -1.93  0.0272 0.0954  
% Females Workers 0.2613  1.11    0.4996 0.2952  
% Part-time workers -0.5228  -2.43  0.2669 0.2730  
Number of Observations 1900
Mean (Standard Deviation) of  wpFP 1.5632  (0.8085)
Wald Chi Squared  69.54 (35 d.f.)  
Log pseudo-likelihood -2180.78
Pseudo R Squared 0.0352
Cut Off Point 1 (standard error) -0.9734  (0.4248)  
Cut Off Point 2 (standard error)   0.4089 (0.4277)  
Cut Off Point 3 (standard error) 1.7343  (0.4294)  
Notes: (i) Occupational structure controls are included: the proportion of: managers and senior officials; professionals; 
associate professional and technical employees; administrative and secretarial employees; skilled trade employees;  
personal service employees; and operative employees. The omitted category is the proportion of routine unskilled 
employees. (ii) Controls for industry are included: manufacturing; construction; wholesale and retail; hotels and 
restaurants; transport and communication; financial services; other business services; public administration; education; 
health; and other community services. The omitted category is electricity, gas and water.  
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Table 3: Financial Performance and Labour Turnover: Marginal Effects and Robustness  
 
Marginal Effects wpFP =0 wpFP =1 wpFP =2 wpFP =3
Panel A: All Workplaces; Ordered Probit  
Quit Rate 0.0783 
(2.01)
0.1279 
(2.04) 
-0.1194 
(-2.07)
-0.0867 
(-1.98)
Quit Rate*Non Unilateral Wage Setting -0.2466 
(-2.25)
-0.4028 
(-2.27) 
0.3762 
(2.30)
0.2732 
(2.22)
Non Unilateral Wage Setting 0.0526 
(2.38)
0.0860 
(2.46) 
-0.0803 
(-2.44)
-0.0583 
(-2.43)
Number of Observations 1900
Wald Chi Squared  69.54 (35 d.f.)  
Log pseudo-likelihood -2180.78
Panel B: All Workplaces; Generalised Ordered Probit  
Quit Rate 0.0469  
(0.98)  
0.1105 
(1.02)  
0.0210  
(0.18)  
-0.1784  
(-2.82)  
Quit Rate*Non Unilateral Wage Setting -0.2210 
(-1.37)  
-0.3551  
(-1.08)  
0.2653 
(0.87)  
0.3108 
   (2.15)  
Non Unilateral Wage Setting 0.0897  
(2.51)  
0.0378  
(0.57)  
-0.1071  
(-1.69)  
-0.0204 
 (-0.73)  
Number of Observations 1900
Wald Chi Squared   250.42 (105 d.f.)  
Log pseudo-likelihood -2074.8686
Panel C: Non Unilateral Wage Setting; Ordered Probit  
Quit Rate -0.1961 
(-1.75)
-0.3262 
(-1.73) 
0.1924 
(1.78)
0.1807 
(1.67)
Number of Observations 484
Wald Chi Squared  68.84 (33 d.f.)
Log pseudo-likelihood -521.66
Panel D: Unilateral Wage Setting Sample 1; Ordered Probit  
Quit Rate 0.0828 
(2.13)
0.1431 
(2.18) 
-0.1293 
(-2.22)
-0.0966 
(-2.10)
Number of Observations 1416
Wald Chi Squared  46.47 (33 d.f.)
Log pseudo-likelihood -1622.15
Panel E: Unilateral Wage Setting Sample 2; Ordered Probit  
Quit Rate 0.0786 
(1.99)
0.1395 
(2.04) 
-0.1240 
(-2.07)
-0.0939 
(-1.97)
Number of Observations 1037
Wald Chi Squared  44.47 (33 d.f.)
Log pseudo-likelihood -1186.28
Panel F: Non Unilateral Wage Setting; Ordered Probit  
Quit Rate -0.2247  
(-1.94)
-0.3628  
(-1.97) 
0.3820 
    (2.02)
0.2055 
(1.88)
Number of Observations 484
Inverse mills ratio term: estimated coefficient (t-statistic) -0.4208  (-1.47)
Wald Chi Squared  64.28 (34d.f.)
Log pseudo-likelihood -524.07
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 Table 3: Financial Performance and Labour Turnover: Marginal Effects and Robustness (continued) 
 
Panel G: Unilateral Wage Setting Sample 1; Ordered Probit  
Quit Rate 0.0836 
(2.15)
0.1413 
(2.18) 
-0.1277 
(-2.22)  
-0.0972 
(-2.12)
Number of Observations 1416
Inverse mills ratio term: estimated coefficient (t-statistic) -0.2416  (-1.24)  
Wald Chi Squared  47.92 (34 d.f.)
Log pseudo-likelihood -1630.1971
Panel H: Unilateral Wage Setting Sample 2; Ordered Probit  
Quit Rate 0.0786  
(1.99)
0.1365  
(2.03)  
-0.1214  
(-2.06)  
-0.0936 
(-1.97)  
Number of Observations 1037
Inverse mills ratio term: estimated coefficient (t-statistic) -0.1830  (-1.07)  
Wald Chi Squared  43.03 (34 d.f.)
Log pseudo-likelihood -1191.79
Note: (i) marginal effects are presented with t-statistics in parenthesis; (ii) sample 1 relates to NUWS =0 and sample 
2 relates to workplaces where 0% of employees have their pay set through negotiations with trades unions. 
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Table 4: Financial Turnover and Labour Turnover  
 
 Estimated Coefficient T-Statistic
Panel A: Non Unilateral Wage Setting; Ordered Probit  
Quit Rate 0.4852 0.26
Number of Observations 204
Panel B: Unilateral Wage Setting Sample 1; Ordered Probit  
Quit Rate -3.6958 -2.58
Number of Observations 629
Panel C: Unilateral Wage Setting Sample 2; Ordered Probit  
Quit Rate -3.3285  -2.17
Number of Observations 441
Panel D: Non Unilateral Wage Setting; Ordered Probit  
Quit Rate 0.9351  0.50
Inverse mills ratio term -0.6119 -1.39
Number of Observations 204
Panel E: Unilateral Wage Setting Sample 1; Ordered Probit  
Quit Rate -3.4332  -2.40
Inverse mills ratio term 1.4518 1.93
Number of Observations 629
Panel F: Unilateral Wage Setting Sample 2; Ordered Probit  
Quit Rate -3.3369 -2.17
Inverse mills ratio term -0.1862 -0.31
Number of Observations 204
Note: sample 1 relates to NUWS =0 and sample 2 relates to workplaces where 0% of employees have their pay set 
through negotiations with trades unions. 
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